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1 Introduction
Inflation uncertainty, as measured by the average across the individual variances of the
cross section of density forecasts from the European Central Bank’s Survey of Professional
Forecasters, has considerably increased since at least the beginning of the recent financial
crisis. The emergence of inflation uncertainty may reflect concerns about further rising
inflation due to expansive monetary policy or fears of deflation as a result of a prolonged
recession period (Drakos and Kouretas, 2015; Scharnagl and Stapf, 2015). Several the-
oretical arguments suggest that macroeconomic uncertainty has negative welfare effects
(Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al., 2011; Bloom et al., 2014). For example, inflation uncertainty
may induce agents to postpone investment and savings decisions, reduce market efficiency
due to an increase in the volatility of relative prices or increase risks regarding income
streams from nominal financial and wage contracts (Friedman, 1977; Levi and Makin,
1979; Huizinga, 1993; Bloom, 2009). Empirical evidence for these arguments is docu-
mented by Grier and Perry (2000), Grier et al. (2000, 2004), Vitek (2002), Elder (2004)
and Wright (2011). In contrast, the level of inflation and inflation expectations have
been relatively low throughout the last decades and evolve in a rather stable way (Gal´ı
and Gambetti, 2009; Herrera and Pesavento, 2009; Conrad and Eife, 2012). This is of-
ten ascribed to successful monetary policy. However, the increase of inflation uncertainty
questions these potential achievements.
Though survey-based measures of inflation uncertainty (henceforth: IU) such as the
average variance from a cross-section of density forecasts (average individual IU) are
often regarded as one of the most reliable ways to quantify uncertainty (Bachmann et al.,
2013; Clements, 2014), many surveys do not elicit density forecasts. In such cases, the
average variance of the point forecasts (disagreement) is often used as a proxy variable
for IU. In addition, disagreement itself is often considered as a variable of interest, e.g.
due to its potential influence on aggregate output (Mankiw and Reis, 2003). Giordani
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and So¨derlind (2003) highlight the merits of using disagreement as a measure of IU.
However, they also document that disagreement only accounts for approximately one half
of the variation in average individual IU from the Survey of Professional Forecasters,
leaving a considerable part of the latter unexplained. Using the same data, Rich and
Tracy (2010) show that disagreement is weakly correlated with IU measures derived from
density forecasts. Moreover, Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) describe several cases in which
disagreement and average individual IU deviate. These observations are rationalized in
a model of forecast error components for deviations of inflation forecasts from realized
inflation by Lahiri and Sheng (2010), who show that disagreement can be understood as
one component of average individual IU.
This study provides a theory-guided empirical examination of the determinants of IU in
the Eurozone. The latter is quantified by means of data from the European Central Bank’s
Survey of Professional Forecasters (ECB-SPF). Employing the forecast error component
model of Davies and Lahiri (1995) and Lahiri and Sheng (2010), we conduct a variance
decomposition which isolates disagreement as one of two components of average individual
IU. The additional component is the variance of the shocks that occur during the period
after forecasters report their predictions until the realization of the inflation rate. The
model predicts that average individual IU and disagreement deviate more strongly for
longer forecast horizons.
In order to analyze the determinants of IU, we employ a dynamic panel model, which is
estimated by a generalized method of moments (GMM) approach as suggested by Arellano
and Bover (1995). After investigating whether the predictions of the model of Lahiri and
Sheng (2010) hold for the ECB-SPF data, the decomposition of average individual IU
serves as a means to select a set of suitable instrumental variables. Moreover, we analyze
to which extent the difference between average individual IU and disagreement evolves
in a predictable way, i.e. if it can be explained by distinct indicators of macroeconomic
conditions and monetary policy. If this is the case, disagreement should not be considered
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a reliable proxy of IU.
We find that the difference between average individual IU and disagreement increases
with the forecast horizon. Moreover, dynamic panel estimates show that the influence of
monetary policy indicators depends on which IU measure is considered as the dependent
variable. Most importantly, average individual IU rises during periods when monetary
policy is more expansive than what is prescribed by a Taylor rule (Taylor, 1993). In con-
trast, disagreement is primarily explained by contractionary monetary policy and stock
market fluctuations. Hence, we do not only find that average individual IU and disagree-
ment deviate more strongly for higher forecast horizons, but also that they are related to
distinct indicators of monetary policy and the economic environment. Further analysis
of the difference between average individual IU and disagreement, i.e. the variance of
aggregate shocks, shows that this component increases during periods when monetary
policy is expansive, whereas disagreement is not affected during such episodes. This sug-
gests that an important reason for the steady increase in average individual IU since the
beginning of the financial crisis is the sustained period of expansionary monetary policy.
This influence is not detected if disagreement alone is used as an indicator of IU. Thus,
assessments of the role of monetary policy for IU based on disagreement are incomplete.
In contrast, both measures of IU are related to macroeconomic conditions such as the
inflation rate and the growth rate of real GDP in a way that is consistent with findings
from other empirical studies such as Lahiri et al. (1988) or Conrad et al. (2010).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical
and empirical literature on the potential determinants of IU. Section 3 describes the IU
measures that are employed in this study, whereas Section 4 introduces the economet-
ric models. The data are introduced in Section 5. Subsequently, Section 6 presents and
discusses the empirical results. In Section 7, we summarize and conclude.
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2 Determinants of IU in the related literature
In the theoretical literature, relationships between several macroeconomic variables and IU
have been identified. Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992) describe a positive influence of the
level of inflation on IU. In addition, Friedman (1977) argues that IU is lower during periods
of high economic growth. Schwert (1989) finds that IU is positively related to stock market
volatility. Other studies identify links between IU and policy-related variables. Taylor
(1993, 2007, 2008, 2012) argues that a predictable, i.e. rule-based, monetary policy reduces
economic uncertainty. According to Taylor (2008), one of the causes of the financial crisis
is that the interest rate set by the FED during the years after 2003 has been lower than
the rate prescribed by a Taylor rule.
Empirically, the Friedman-Ball-hypothesis has been confirmed in several studies in-
cluding Lahiri et al. (1988), Conrad and Karanasos (2005a), Conrad et al. (2010) and
Hartmann and Herwartz (2012). Moreover, Mankiw et al. (2003) and Lamla and Maag
(2012) find evidence for a positive relationship between disagreement and the inflation rate
and a negative relationship between disagreement and GDP growth. Engle and Rangel
(2008) and Conrad and Loch (2014) show that high volatility on global equity markets
is associated with high IU. Dovern et al. (2012) highlight the particularly important role
of monetary policy as a determinant of disagreement and document that disagreement
in the G7 economies can be explained by the level of inflation, the output gap, the in-
terest rate and an indicator of central bank independence. Ehrmann et al. (2012) show
that higher transparency in central bank communication reduces disagreement due to a
reduction in forecasters’ cost of acquiring and processing new information. Wright (2011)
finds that risk premia derived from yield curves as the difference between short- and long-
term interest rates are positively related to IU. This implies that differences in horizons
play an important role, which motivates our approach to distinguish between forecasting
horizons. Conrad and Hartmann (2014) show that deteriorated macroeconomic conditions
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and discretionary monetary policy have a joint impact on IU and that it is particularly
periods of expansionary monetary policy that are positively related to IU.
In the following, we contribute to this literature by providing a comparison between
the determinants of average individual IU and disagreement. The comparative evaluation
is based on the theoretical framwork of Davies and Lahiri (1995) and Lahiri and Sheng
(2010), which is introduced in the next section.
3 Forecasting and uncertainty
In this section, we describe the ex-ante measures of IU that are based on survey data. The
employed model of IU is borrowed from Davies and Lahiri (1995) and Lahiri and Sheng
(2010), and is based on the h-step ahead inflation forecast errors, ei,t+h|t, of individual
survey participants i = 1, ..., N , defined as
ei,t+h|t = pit+h − µi,t+h|t. (1)
In (1), the inflation rate is denoted as pit+h and µi,t+h|h represents an h-step ahead forecast.
The quarterly survey periods are represented by the index t = 1, ..., T . Following Davies
and Lahiri (1995) and Lahiri and Sheng (2010), the forecast error in (1) is decomposed
into the sum of a common and an idiosyncratic component,
ei,t+h|t = λt+h|t + εi,t+h|t, (2)
where λt+h|t =
∑h
j=1 ut+j denotes the sum of all shocks ut+j between survey period t and
target period t+ h that are common to all forecasters. Individual characteristics such as
differences in forecasters’ information sets or their methods of processing new information
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are incorporated in εi,t+h|t.1 We analyze fixed-horizon forecasts, characterized by a fixed
forecast horizon and a rolling target period, whereas Davies and Lahiri (1995) and Lahiri
and Sheng (2010) discuss fixed-event forecasts, characterized by a fixed target period
and a rolling forecast horizon. Lahiri and Sheng (2010) make the following assumptions:
First, E[ut+j] = 0 and Var[ut+j] = σ
2
u,t+j for any t and j. Moreover, the shocks are
uncorrelated at different points in time, so that E[ut+jut+j′ ] = 0 for any t and j 6= j′ and
E[ut+jut′+j] = 0 for any j and t 6= t′. Second, E[εi,t+h|t] = 0 and Var[εi,t+h|t] = σ2ε,i,t+h|t
for any i, t and h and the individual shocks of different forecasters are uncorrelated with
each other, so that E[εi,t+h|tεi′,t+h|t] = 0 for any t, h and i 6= i′. Third, the individual and
aggregate shocks are uncorrelated: E[εi,t+h|tut′+j] = 0 for any i, t, t′, h and j. Given these
assumptions, ex ante expected disagreement, i.e. the expectation of the cross-sectional
variance of µi,t+h|t, can be written as
S2t+h|t =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
E
(εi,t+h|t − 1
N
N∑
j=1
εj,t+h|t
)2 = 1
N
N∑
i=1
σ2ε,i,t+h|t. (3)
Moreover, individual IU, defined as the conditional variance of the errors in (2), is given
by
σ2i,t+h|t = σ
2
λ,t+h|t + σ
2
ε,i,t+h|t, (4)
where σ2λ,t+h|t =
∑h
j=1 σ
2
u,t+j denotes the perceived uncertainty regarding future aggregate
shocks under the assumptions stated above. Following Zarnowitz and Lambros (1987) and
1Lahiri and Sheng (2010) argue that (2) can also include a third component, φi,h, which might reflect
an individual horizon-specific bias. However, the arguments in the theoretical model of Lahiri and Sheng
(2010) are derived by disregarding φi,h, since the estimates of this component are relatively small. Simi-
larly, we find that estimates of φi,h for the ECB-SPF data are of negligible size for all forecast horizons.
Therefore, we also disregard this component.
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Lahiri and Sheng (2010), we obtain average individual IU as
σ2t+h|t =
1
N
N∑
i=1
σ2i,t+h|t. (5)
This IU statistic can be interpreted as the uncertainty about the inflation forecast of
a randomly drawn survey participant (Lahiri and Sheng, 2010). Given the assumptions
stated above and relying on (2), Lahiri and Sheng (2010) decompose σ2t+h|t such that
σ2t+h|t = σ
2
λ,t+h|t + S
2
t+h|t. (6)
In (6), average individual IU is given by the sum of the variance of aggregate shocks
and expected disagreement. Consequently, the variance of the aggregate shocks can be
interpreted as the wedge between average individual IU and disagreement. Since σ2λ,t+h|t =∑h
j=1 σ
2
u,t+j, this component increases with the forecast horizon h. The claim that the
difference between average individual IU and disagreement increases with the forecast
horizon is a direct consequence of the model specification. A large σ2λ,t+h|t may also occur
if forecasters are increasingly uncertain, e.g. during recession periods. Thus, the model
suggests that the suitability of disagreement as a measure of IU may depend on both the
forecast horizon and the state of the economy.
In this study, we use survey data to estimate the unobserved quantities in (6). Let
fi,t+h|t denote a density forecast for the inflation rate, pit+h, reported by individual fore-
caster i. Individual inflation expectations are expressed by the mean, µi,t+h|t, of fi,t+h|t.
We quantify disagreement by
s2t+h|t =
1
N − 1
N∑
i=1
(
µi,t+h|t − µt+h|t
)2
, (7)
where µt+h|t = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 µi,t+h|t.
2 Lahiri and Sheng (2010) show that, for sufficiently
2Usually, disagreement is defined as the variance of point forecasts. We employ the means of the
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large N , s2t+h|t can be used to approximate S
2
t+h|t in (3). Moreover, the variance of the
individual density forecasts, fi,t+h|t, delivers an estimate of individual IU, σ2i,t+h|t, from
which σ2t+h|t is obtained using (5). Replacing S
2
t+h|t in (6) with s
2
t+h|t, we obtain an estimate
of the variance of aggregate shocks, σ2λ,t+h|t.
4 Modeling inflation uncertainty
This section introduces the empirical models that are employed to analyze the determi-
nants of IU. We first examine how average individual IU and disagreement are related to
each other. Departing from the model of Lahiri and Sheng (2010), we then analyze how
average individual IU and disagreement are associated with various indicators of macroe-
conomic conditions and monetary policy that have been identified as drivers of IU in the
related literature. In order to determine how the difference between both IU measures
can be explained, we relate the variance of aggregate shocks to observable factors in a
final step.
4.1 Explaining the variance of aggregate shocks
The decomposition of Lahiri and Sheng (2010) in equation (6) states that the variance of
aggregate shocks equals the difference between average individual IU and disagreement.
The model assumptions imply that σ2λ,t+h|t increases with h. Moreover, the difference
between σ2t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t may also increase during recession periods. In order to evaluate
empirically how much σ2t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t deviate from each other, we estimate the following
pooled model which includes observations for all forecast horizons h = 1, ..., H:
σ2λ,t+h|t = ζ1D
h=1 + ...+ ζHD
h=H + γ1(t− 1) + γ2DRECt−1 + νt+h|t, (8)
density forecasts instead. Clements (2012) provides a critical discussion.
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where νt+h|t ∼ (0, σ2ν,h) is the error term. The indicator variables Dh=1, ..., Dh=H are
defined such that, for example, Dh=1 is equal to unity for h = 1, and zero for all other
horizons. Since the model of Lahiri and Sheng (2010) suggests that the variance of the
aggregate shocks increases with the forecast horizon, it is expected that ζH > ... > ζ1 > 0.
To account for potential non-stationarity of σ2λ,t+h|t, a time trend, t − 1, is included.
The impact of recessions is captured by the indicator variable DRECt−1 , which is equal to
unity during recession periods, and zero in all other cases. Recessions are identified by the
method of Bry and Boschan (1971) using the output gap, x˜t−1 = 100×
(
xt−1 − xHPt−1
)
as an
indicator of the business cycle with xt−1 = ln(Xt−1) denoting the natural logarithm of the
level of real GDP, Xt−1, and xHPt−1 as the trend component of xt−1, which is extracted by
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. Thereby, we identify the peaks and troughs of economics
activity in the Eurozone. Following Chauvet and Hamilton (2005), a recession is defined
as the period between a peak and a trough (excluding the former but including the latter).
If the variance of aggregate shocks increases during recession periods, we would expect
that γ2 > 0.
4.2 Macroeconomic and policy influences on IU
The decomposition of Lahiri and Sheng (2010) implies that average individual IU and
disagreement should be considered as distinct measures of IU. Thus, we evaluate them
separately in the following. In order to control for forecaster-specific characteristics, we
exploit the information from the panel of forecasters and set up the dynamic panel spec-
ification
yi,t+h|t = ρhyi,t+h−1|t−1 +α′hmt−1 + β
′
hpt−1 + γ
′
hdt−1 + vi,t+h|t (9)
for i = 1, ..., N , where yi,t+h|t ∈ {σ2i,t+h|t, σ2ε,i,t+h|t} denotes either individual IU or the
variance of individual shocks, mt−1 is a 3× 1 vector of macroeconomic conditions, pt−1 is
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a 6× 1 vector containing indicators of monetary policy, dt−1 = (1, t− 1, DRECt−1 )′ is a 3× 1
vector of predetermined variables and αh,βh and γh denote the corresponding coefficient
vectors. Moreover, vi,t+h|t = ηi,h+νi,t+h|t represents the error term. The forecaster-specific
fixed effects, ηi,h, capture unobserved heterogeneity with respect to individual IU. We
estimate (9) using the approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and include up to six-
period lagged levels as well as the first differences of yi,t+h−1|t−1 and the variables in mt−1
and pt−1 as instrumental variables. In addition, we include σ2λ,t+h−1|t−1, which is part of
σ2i,t+h−1|t−1 according to the definition in (4). Hence, σ
2
λ,t+h−1|t−1 is likely to be a relevant
instrument for σ2i,t+h−1|t−1. Moreover, past realizations of the IU measures, σ
2
t+1h−1|t−1 and
s2t+h−1|t−1, are readily available to forecasters when they report their predictions in period t
and thus can be considered as part of their information sets. Thus, σ2λ,t+h−1|t−1 should also
be exogeneous. To account for forecaster-specific heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation
in νi,t+h|t, we use robust standard errors and apply the adjustment by Windmeijer (2005).
Unlike (8), the model in (9) is estimated separately for each forecast horizon h. For
notational convenience, we do not differentiate between the coefficients for alternative
choices of yi,t+h|t in (9). The variance of the individual shocks, σ2ε,i,t+h|t, is obtained using
(4),
σ2ε,i,t+h|t = σ
2
i,t+h|t − σ2λ,t+h|t. (10)
Inflation uncertainty may be related to the macroeconomic conditions as hypothesized
by Friedman (1977) and Schwert (1989). Macroeconomic influences on IU are summa-
rized in mt−1 = (pit−1,∆xt−1, RVt−1(E))′. According to Friedman (1977), two important
covariates of IU are the level of inflation, which is defined as the year-on-year change of
the quarterly Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP),
pit−1 = 100× HICPt−1 −HICPt−5
HICPt−5
, (11)
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and output growth,
∆xt−1 = 100× Xt−1 −Xt−5
Xt−5
. (12)
Empirical evidence regarding these relations has been documented by Conrad and Karana-
sos (2005b), Dovern et al. (2012) or Hartmann and Roestel (2013). Moreover, Engle and
Rangel (2008) and Conrad and Loch (2014) document that IU is related to stock market
volatility in the US. We measure stock market fluctuations by employing the intra-quarter
variation of squared returns,
RVt−1(E) = 100×
√∑
`∈t−1
r2`,t−1, (13)
with r`,t−1 = ln(P`,t−1/P`−1,t−1) denoting the daily return of equity prices, P`,t−1.
Apart from macroeconomic conditions, IU might also be influenced by mone-
tary policy. This hypotheses has been described, for example, in the widely-
cited study of Ball (1992). Indicators of (monetary) policy are summarized in
pt−1 = (∆EPUt−1,∆ASt−1, TD+t−1, |TD−t−1|,MPCt−1,∆MMt−1)′. IU might be affected
by spillovers from uncertainty about economic and political conditions in general. To
account for such influences, we consider the changes in the economic policy uncertainty
indicator as denoted ∆EPUt−1 (cf. Baker and Bloom, 2013). A further source of IU might
be the unconventional monetary policy measures adopted by the ECB such as the changes
in the asset position of the central bank’s balance sheet. The relation between IU and
balance sheet adjustments, denoted ∆ASt−1, might capture perceived increases in infla-
tion risks due to the ECB’s large-scale asset purchases since 2008. Moreover, a relation
between deviations from rule-based monetary policy and uncertainty in general has been
put forth in a series of articles by Taylor (2007, 2008, 2012). The degree to which the
ECB might have deviated from a predictable monetary policy scheme such as the Taylor
(1993) rule is expressed by the variables TD+t−1 and |TD−t−1|. Deviations from the Taylor
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rule are defined as
TDt−1 = it−1 − i∗t−1, (14)
where it−1 is the interest rate set by the central bank and i∗t−1 is the optimal predicted
Taylor rule interest rate specified as a function of the inflation rate and the output gap
in line with the dynamic model proposed by Clarida et al. (1998),
it−1 = ω0 + ω1pit+3 + ω2x˜t−1 + ξt−1. (15)
Since the regressors in (15) are endogenous, the model is estimated by means of GMM
using up to four-period lags of it−1, pit−1 and x˜t−1 as instrumental variables. Based on
(14) and (15), we define TD+t−1 = TDt−1 × 1(TDt−1 > 0), where 1(TDt−1 > 0) equals
unity if TDt−1 > 0, and zero else. Similarly, |TD−t−1| = |TDt−1| × 1(TDt−1 < 0), where
1(TDt−1 < 0) equals unity if TDt−1 < 0, and zero else. Furthermore, the role of cen-
tral bank communication for the emergence or containment of uncertainty is frequently
discussed in the literature. Morris and Shin (2002) develop a theoretical models to show
that policymakers can maximize social welfare by providing as much public information
as possible in the absence of private information. Empirically, Ehrmann et al. (2012) show
that higher central bank communication reduces disagreement. In order to account for
these findings, we consider the Monetary Policy Communicator, MPCt−1, which quanti-
fies the ECB’s communication of risks regarding future price stability. Finally, IU might
emerge from large-scale increases in monetary aggregates. We acknowledge this potential
transmission channel by consideration of ∆MMt−1, which denotes changes of the so-called
money multiplier,
MMt−1 =
M3t−1
M0t−1
, (16)
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with M3t−1 denoting an indicator for the broad money supply and M0t−1 denoting the
more narrow definition of base money. Holland (1995) argues that monetary policy may
be tempted to stimulate output growth via monetary surprises if such shocks are less ob-
servable to consumers during turbulent times. This creates higher uncertainty about both
money growth and inflation. To summarize, pt−1 comprises indicators of the monetary
policy stance that are based on interest rates but also takes more traditional, money-based
indicators into account.
In each survey period, the SPF contains a certain number of missing values. In or-
der to determine whether the estimation of the model in (9) is influenced by the pres-
ence of missing values, we relate the aggregated measures of IU to the same observable
factors as before. This is based on the argument of Lahiri and Sheng (2010) that aver-
age individual IU can be interpreted as the uncertainty of the average forecaster. Since
σ2t+h|t = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i,t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 σ
2
,i,t+h|t, it follows from (9) that
yt+h|t = ρhyt+h−1|t−1 +α′hmt−1 + β
′
hpt−1 + γ
′
hdt−1 + vt+h|t, (17)
where yt+h|t ∈ {σ2t+h|t, s2t+h|t} denotes either average individual IU or disagreement and
vt+h|t = ηh + νt+h|t with ηh = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 ηi,h and νt+h|t = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 νi,t+h|t. Comparing
equations (9) and (17) shows that the impact of the macroeconomic and policy variables on
individual and aggregate measures of IU is identical. Consequently, the empirical evidence
from equation (9) can be directly compared to the findings for average individual IU and
disagreement.
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4.3 Decomposing the influences on IU
So far we have argued that it is necessary to evaluate average individual IU and disagree-
ment separately and set up two models in (17),3
σ2t+h|t = α
′
1,hmt−1 + β
′
1,hpt−1 + γ
′
1,hdt−1 + v1,t+h|t (18)
and
s2t+h|t = α
′
2,hmt−1 + β
′
2,hpt−1 + γ
′
2,hdt−1 + v2,t+h|t. (19)
According to the decomposition of Lahiri and Sheng (2010), s2t+h|t is a component of σ
2
t+h|t.
If the impact of the covariates on both measures differs, this must be due to a systematic
influence of mt−1 and pt−1 on on the second component of IU, σ2λ,t+h|t. Thus, we also
analyze the determinants of the variance of aggregate shocks by means of
σ2λ,t+h|t = α
′
3,hmt−1 + β
′
3,hpt−1 + γ
′
3,hdt−1 + ν3,t+h|t, (20)
where ν3,t+h|t is the horizon-specific error term. Inserting (19) and (20) into the decom-
position in (6), we obtain
σ2t+h|t = (α
′
2,h +α
′
3,h)mt−1 + (β
′
2,h + β
′
3,h)pt−1 + (γ
′
2,h + γ
′
3,h)dt−1 + v2,t+h|t + ν3,t+h|t.(21)
By comparing (18) and (21) it can be seen that the impact of the macroeconomic con-
ditions and policy indicators on overall IU is given by their aggregate impact on the two
components of IU since α′1,h = α
′
2,h + α
′
3,h and β
′
1,h = β
′
2,h + β
′
3,h. If, for example,
3In this subsection, we deviate from our previous approach and explicitly account for the fact that the
coefficients vary for different dependent variables. Here, subscripts 1, 2 and 3 denote coefficients when
the dependent variable is σ2t+h|t, s
2
t+h|t or σ
2
λ,t+h|t, respectively. We also exclude the lagged dependet
variable from all models because otherwise the effect of the covarites on average individual IU cannot be
decomposed in the way presented in this subsection.
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expansionary monetary policy, as measured by |TD−t−1|, has no effect on s2t+h|t but in-
creases σ2λ,t+h|t, the net effect of such a policy on σ
2
t+h|t may be positive. Looking only
at disagreement as a proxy for overall IU, however, one would mistakingly conclude that
expansionary monetary policy does not increase IU in this scenario. This example illus-
trates why the decomposition of Lahiri and Sheng (2010) has important implications for
the analysis of the determinants of IU. It is necessary to check whether there are observ-
able factors which increase the difference between σ2t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t in a systematic way. If
this is the case, disagreement does not capture all relevant influences on IU and should
thus not be considered as a reliable proxy of IU.
5 Data
Forecast data is provided by the Survey of Professional Forecasters, which has been con-
ducted by the European Central Bank during successive quarters since 1999Q1. We employ
density forecasts, fi,t+h|t, regarding future HICP inflation in the Eurozone, pit+h. As can
be seen in Table 1, the intervals employed in the SPF questionnaire have changed on some
occasions.
[TABLE 1 HERE]
The sample contains fixed-horizon forecasts from the surveys conducted between 1999Q1
and 2013Q2, so that T = 58, for h ∈ {4, 8, 20}, denoting forecast horizons of one-year-,
two-years- and five-years-ahead, respectively. The time series for h = 20 is only available
starting in 2001Q1. We exclude forecasters from our analysis whenever they do not report
an appropriate density forecast, e.g. if reported subjective probabilities do not sum to
one. The remaining cross-section comprises predictions from N = 98 anonymous fore-
casters. Figure 1 depicts the participation of these forecasters in the SPF surveys for
different forecast horizons. Evidently, the panel is unbalanced. However, the number of
missing observations is lower than for the US-SPF, for which Lahiri et al. (2014) document
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a substantial fraction of missing observations.
[FIGURE 1 HERE]
We follow Engelberg et al. (2009) and fit a generalized beta distribution to the individual
histograms if forecasters attach non-zero probabilities to at least three different intervals.4
Figure 2 depicts individual and average inflation expectations as well as aggregate IU
measures over the survey period t for h ∈ {4, 8, 20}. The graphs for µi,t,h show that long-
term expectations are scattered around the ECB’s target of an inflation rate ,,below, but
close to, 2%“ (ECB, 2014) without any visible up or down tendency. For all h, the σ2t+h|t
measures evolve fairly constant between 1999 and 2007 but show an upward trend from
2007 until the end of the sample period. The s2t+h|t statistics show considerable increases
during the years 2008 and 2009. However, for all h, s2t+h|t reverts to its pre-crisis level
after a short period of time. This is in line with the argument of Lahiri and Sheng (2010)
that the trajectory of s2t+h|t may differ from the one of σ
2
t+h|t, depending on the perceived
variation of forthcoming aggregate shocks, σ2λ,t+h|t. In addition, the plots show that, on
average, σ2t+h|t and σ
2
λ,t+h|t increase with h, whereas there are little deviations between the
s2t+h|t statistics, except for the peak in 2009, which is smaller for larger h.
[FIGURE 2 HERE]
Rich et al. (2012) also construct IU measures from the ECB-SPF data set, though they
use an alternative approach, which is based on rolling-horizon forecasts. Distinguishing
between the variance of the aggregate density forecast and average individual IU, Rich et
al. (2012) find that IU evolves in a relatively stable way through the second quarter of
2007 and increases steadily afterwards. This in line with the evidence depicted in Figure
2. The findings of Rich et al. (2012) with respect to the disagreement statistic are also in
line with the ones reported here.
4Triangular distributions are fitted when less than three intervals are used. For details see Engelberg
et al. (2009).
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Table 2 reports correlations across IU measures. In line with the decomposition in (6),
average individual IU is positively correlated with both disagreement and the variance
of aggregate shocks. The strength of the relation between σ2t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t seems to
be relatively high but declines with h from a correlation coefficient of 0.5 for h = 4
to less than 0.4 for h = 20. The correlation statistics between s2t+h|t and σ
2
λ,t+h|t also
decline (in absolute terms) for larger forecast horizons. These findings are indicated by
correlation statistics which are marked in boldface. In addition, correlations between the
σ2t+h|t measures are higher than correlations between s
2
t+h|t or σ
2
λ,t+h|t measures for different
h.
[TABLE 2 HERE]
Inflation rates, pit, and real GDP growth rates, ∆xt, are drawn from the Statistical Data
Warehouse (SDW) database of the ECB. This data source provides real-time data, which
are most closely related to the information available to forecasters at the time when
predictions are reported. Using the GDP data, we calculate the output gap, x˜t, from
which three periods of economic recessions are identified for our sample period: 2001Q1
to 2005Q3, 2008Q2 to 2009Q2 and 2011Q4 to 2013Q2. Quarterly realized stock market
volatility, RVt(E), is calculated using Eurostoxx bluechip net returns for the Eurozone.
5
To measure changes in the quarterly economic policy uncertainty, ∆EPUt, we use the
monthly EU Economic Policy Uncertainty Index of Baker et al. (2013), which is defined
as the weighted sum of three components: Newspaper coverage of policy-related economic
uncertainty with a weight of 0.5, forecaster disagreement about federal government bud-
get balances with a weight of 0.25 and inflation disagreement with a weight of 0.25. The
newspaper component is defined as the normalized coverage of policy-related economic
uncertainty by ten influential newspapers from major EU countries and measured by
the number of newspapers containing at least one term from each of the three sets ,,un-
5http://www.stoxx.com/data/historical/historical_bluechip.html
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certain/uncertainty“, ,,economic/economy“ and ,,policy/tax/spending/regulation/central
bank/budget deficit“.6 The index ∆EPUt as we use it does not include inflation disagree-
ment. We remove this component and rescale the remaining index by dividing it by 100.
Changes in the ECB’s balance sheet, ∆ASt, are measured using data on the quarterly
total assets/liabilities in the Euro area in trillions of Euros. The data series is drawn from
the SDW database, which also provides data on interest rates used in the construction of
both TD+t and |TD−t |.7 To quantify ECB communication regarding forthcoming threats to
price stability, we include MPCt, which is defined as the quarterly average of the monthly
Monetary Policy Communicator, which is published by the KOF (cf. Conrad and Lamla,
2010). This indicator translates the ECB president’s statements on price stability during
the monthly ECB press conferences into numerical values, such that MPCt ∈ [−1,+1]
with positive (negative) values indicating upside (downside) risks to price stability.8 Mea-
sures of money supply used in the construction of ∆MMt are also drawn from the SDW.
Figure 3 plots the macroeconomic variables and indicators of monetary policy.
[FIGURE 3 HERE]
The graphs show that the levels of EPUt, ASt and MMt might be non-stationary. Hence,
we consider their first differences, ∆EPUt,∆ASt and ∆MMt, in the empirical models
instead of their levels.9
6 Results
In this section, empirical results for the models introduced in Section 4 are summarized
and discussed. We first examine how the variance of aggregate shocks depends on the
forecast horizon and whether it changes during recession periods. In order to analyze the
6http://www.policyuncertainty.com/europe_monthly.html
7http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu/quickview.do?SERIES_KEY=123.ILM.W.U2.C.T000.Z5.Z01
8https://www.kof.ethz.ch/de/indikatoren/monetary-policy-communicator/
9In addition to the graphical evidence in Figure 3, the results from augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF)
tests suggest non-stationarity in most cases. Results are provided by the authors upon request.
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determinants of IU, distinct measures of IU are then related to indicators of macroeco-
nomic conditions and monetary policy. Third, we examine which observable factors can
explain the difference between average individual IU and disagreement.
6.1 Explaining the variance of aggregate shocks
Table 3 contains the estimates of equation (8) for a sample including time series for all
forecast horizons h = 4, 8, 20.
[TABLE 3 HERE]
The results for the horizon-specific indicator variables, Dh=4, Dh=8 and Dh=20, show that
the variance of aggregate shocks significantly increases with h and, thus, underscore the
claim of the model of Lahiri and Sheng (2010) that the difference between average indi-
vidual IU and disagreement increases with the forecast horizon. This means that horizon-
specific considerations explain a considerable fraction of this difference. Hence, σ2t+h|t and
s2t+h|t provide distinct assessments of IU. In contrast, the coefficient on D
REC
t−1 is insignif-
icant, which means that the difference between average individual IU and disagreement
does not increase during recessions, although the coefficient of DRECt−1 has the expected
positive sign.
6.2 Dynamic panel estimates for individual IU measures
In this section, we discuss how different IU statistics can be explained by macroeconomic
and policy variables. Table 4 presents the dynamic panel estimates of equation (9). To
highlight the effect of variables which quantify macroeconomic conditions as described
in prominent theoretical discussions such as Friedman (1977) and Schwert (1989), the
models in (9) are first estimated leaving aside the indicators of monetary policy in pt−1.
In a second step, the models with all explanatory variables are estimated.
[TABLE 4 HERE]
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From Table 4 it can be seen that the inflation rate, pit−1, is positively, but weakly, related to
σ2i,t+h|t. This is in line with the theoretical arguments by Friedman (1977) and Ball (1992).
The insignificant coefficients in the even-numbered columns may be partly explained by
the fact that pit−1 is positively correlated with both TD+t−1 and |TD−t−1| due to the inclusion
of the inflation rate as a covariate in (15). In addition, pit−1 is positively correlated with
∆MPCt−1, reflecting the fact that higher values of the Monetary Policy Communicator
suggest that the central bank communicates inflation risks. In line with the arguments of
Friedman (1977) that higher economic growth reduces IU, the results indicate a significant
negative relationship between σ2i,t+h|t and ∆xt−1. The impact of stock market volatility is
insignificant for all horizons, althouhg the estimated coefficients have the expected positive
sign for h = 4 and 8.
In the even-numbered columns, we report findings regarding the relationship between
IU and indicators of monetary policy. The results show that during periods of expan-
sionary monetary policy such as the years following the beginning of the crisis, (average)
individual IU also tends to be high. This is expressed by the positive relationship between
negative deviations from the Taylor rule, |TD−t−1|, and σ2i,t+h|t for all h. This highlights the
important role of monetary policy for the emergence of IU. As can be seen in Figure 2, the
σ2t+h|t statistics increase from an initial level of around 0.2 before the beginning of the crisis
to approximately 0.4 afterwards. The interest rate policy of the ECB during the crisis is
characterized by sustained periods of negative deviations from the optimal Taylor rule of
up to three percent, which can be seen in Figure 3. The estimated coefficients on |TD−t−1|
in columns (2), (4) and (6) suggest that a one percent deviation of the interest rate from
the optimal Taylor rule increases (average) individual IU by approximately 0.04 units.
This a relatively large effect and suggests that expansionary monetary policy accounts
for more than 50 percent of the increase in average individual IU since the beginning of
the crisis for all horizons. In contrast, positive deviations from the Taylor rule, TD+t−1,
are only related to short-term IU, σ2i,t+4|t, although the estimated effect is also relatively
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large.
In columns (7) to (12) we present the estimates when the variance of individual shocks,
σ2ε,i,t+h|t, is used as the dependent variable. The relationship between macroeconomic
conditions and σ2ε,i,t+h|t is similar to the evidence for σ
2
i,t+h|t. However, in line with Engle
and Rangel (2008) and Conrad and Loch (2014), realized stock market volatility, RVt−1(E)
is positively related to the variance of individual shocks for h = 4 and 8.
With respect to the importance of monetary policy, we find that σ2ε,i,t+h|t is positively
associated with TD+t−1 for h = 4 and 8. The estimated effects are quantitatively large. This
implies that disagreement rises during periods of restrictive interest rate policy. This is in
contrast to the findings for σ2i,t+h|t, which suggest that individual IU is more closely related
to expansionary monetary policy. In addition, periods of contractionary monetary policy
are expected to lead to a decline in the inflation rate, which should reduce disagreement
based on the positive relationship between pit−1 and σ2ε,i,t+h|t. However, the positive impact
of TD+t−1 suggests that the decision of the central bank to deviate from a rule-based
monetary policy increases disagreement in a way that outweighs the potential reduction
that results from the policy-induced reduction of the inflation rate. Since disagreement
is a component of average individual IU and since contractionary monetary policy is
not related to IU in columns (1) to (6), this suggests that the the overall effect of such
deviations on IU should be small, despite its relationship with disagreement. Rather,
it is periods of expansionary interest rate policy that are related to increases in IU. In
addition, σ2ε,i,t+4|t is also positively related to ∆ASt−1 and ∆MMt−1, which implies that
forecasters disagree about the implications of large changes in the ECB’s balance sheet
and monetary aggregates for future inflation.
Table 4 also reports p-values for the Hansen test of overidentifying restrictions. We
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the overidentification restrictions are valid in all
model specifications for σ2i,t,h and almost all cases for the variance of individual shocks,
σ2ε,i,t+h|t. This supports the robustness of the employed dynamic panel specification. The
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number of instruments used in each specification is fairly large due to the weak relevance
in columns (7) to (12), but is smaller than the number of forecasters.
To summarize, individual IU and the variance of individual shocks are related to dis-
tinct indicators of monetary policy. This has important implications in terms of evaluating
whether unpredictable changes in monetary policy may be associated with increases in
the level of IU or not. Given the results in Table 4 for the variance of individual shocks
as the dependent variable, it appears that positive deviations from a rule-based interest
rate policy are associated with higher IU. However, it is negative deviations that are most
important for the explanation of the increase in (average) individual IU across all forecast
horizons.
6.3 The determinants of the variance of aggregate shocks
The results in the previous section reveal that different measures of IU are related to
distinct indicators of monetary policy. In particular, (average) individual IU rises dur-
ing periods of expansionary monetary policy, while disagreement does not. In order to
examine the distinction between average individual IU and disagreement, we relate their
difference, i.e. the variance of aggregate shocks, to macroeconomic conditions and pol-
icy indicators for different forecast horizons. Equation (??) is estimated using the same
indicators of macroeconomic conditions and monetary policy used in sections 6.2 for the
anticipation horizons h ∈ {4, 8, 20}. The results are reported in Table 5.
[TABLE 5 HERE]
We find that σ2λ,t+h|t is positively related to the inflation rate, pit−1, and the deviation
variable |TD−t−1|. This means that periods of expansionary monetary policy increase
the variance of the forthcoming aggregate shocks. In addition, we find that σ2λ,t+h|t is
negatively related to the real GDP growth rate, ∆xt−1, stock market volatility, RVt−1(E),
changes in the central bank’s asset position, ∆ASt−1, positive deviations from the Taylor
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rule, TD+t−1, and changes in the money multiplier, ∆MMt−1. Thus, it appears that,
with the exception of |TD−t−1|, most indicators of monetary policy reduce the variance
of future aggregate shocks. This helps to explain the previous findings regarding the
determinants of individual IU from Table 4. In particular, positive deviations from the
Taylor rule increase disagreement but systematically reduce the perceived variance of
aggregate shocks. If these effects offset each other, (average) individual IU may not
appear to be significantly related to TD+t−1. In contrast, negative deviations from the
Taylor rule increase the perceived variance of aggregate shocks but seem to have little
impact on the variance of individual shocks and, therefore, disagreement. Hence, the
overall effect on individual IU is positive. In other words, |TD−t−1| appears to contribute
to the difference between σ2t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t, i.e. expansionary monetary policy increases the
variance of aggregate shocks common to all individual forecasters unambiguously, and,
thereby, increases (average) individual IU. To summarize, policy evaluations based on
disagreement as a proxy for IU are potentially incomplete and misleading.
6.4 Estimates for aggregate IU measures
The results from the dynamic panel model may be affected by both the presence of missing
values in our sample and the choice of instruments. As a robustness check, we report the
estimates for the determinants of the aggregate IU measures, σ2t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t, as defined in
(17). By the same argument as in Section 6.2, we distinguish between average individual
IU and disagreement to highlight how individual findings might deviate regarding the
influences on IU. Table 6 contains the estimates of equation (17).
[TABLE 6 HERE]
The results for the impact of the macroeconomic conditions are broadly in line with the
findings from Table 4 in Section 6.2. The relationship between the inflation rate, pit−1,
and both σ2t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t is insignificant, whereas the real GDP growth rate, ∆xt−1, is
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negatively related to average individual IU, σ2t+h|t. In addition, both σ
2
t+h|t and s
2
t+h|t are
positively related to stock market volatility, RVt−1(E), for h = 4 and 8, even though the
impact on disagreement is quantitatively larger.
With respect to the indicators of monetary policy, we find that σ2t+h|t is related to
|TD−t−1|, while s2t+h|t is more strongly associated with TD+t−1. This is in line with the
previous evidence and suggests that average individual IU is higher during periods of
expansionary monetary policy, whereas disagreement is higher when monetary polciy is
contractionary. The estimated size of these effects is similar to ones from Table (4). In
addition, the estimated coefficient on |TD−t−1| is positive and significant for h = 20 but
smaller than the corresponding coefficient for σ2t+20|t in column (7). The explanatory power
of the models for σ2t+h|t is markedly higher than for s
2
t+h|t in 6.
Overall, the results from Table 6 support the main findings from Table 4 and highlight
the importance of the decomposition of Lahiri and Sheng (2010) in that disagreement is
an incomplete approximation of IU and is related to different variables than measures of
IU derived from density forecasts. The presence of missing values in the SPF panel does
not appear to have a strong impact on the estimates from the dynamic panel model.
7 Conclusion
We analyze average individual IU and disagreement as two distinct measures of IU. The
estimation sample covers the period before and after the beginning of the recent financial
crisis in the Eurozone. While disagreement reverts to its pre-crisis level after a short period
of time, average individual IU continues to rise. In line with the decomposition proposed
by Lahiri and Sheng (2010), which shows that average individual IU can be regarded as
the sum of disagreement and the variance of aggregate shocks, the empirical evidence
shows that the difference between average individual IU and disagreement increases with
the forecast horizon. Based on the empirical confirmation of the decomposition, we relate
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different measures of IU to a number of macroeconomic and policy variables that have
been proposed as being related to IU in both the theoretical and empirical literature.
Exploiting the full information contained in the cross-section of forecasters, we find that
the relationship between individual IU and macroeconomic conditions is in line with the
typical findings in the literature. However, the employed measures of IU are related to
fundamentally different indicators of monetary policy. What is most striking is that
average individual IU is primarily associated with expansionary monetary policy, whereas
disagreement is more strongly associated with contractionary episodes. Moreover, we find
that the difference between these measures systematically increases when monetary policy
is unduly expansive. We conclude that disagreement is a misleading measure of IU for the
purpose of assessing the risks associated with the European Central Bank’s management
of the financial and sovereign debt crisis.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Intervals used in the Survey of Professional Forecasters questionnaire
fi,t+h|t
1999Q1-2000Q3 (−∞;−0.1] . . . [0.5(k − 1); 0.5k − 0.1], k = 1, ..., 7 . . . [3.5; +∞)
2000Q4 (−∞;−0.1] . . . [0.5(k − 1); 0.5k − 0.1], k = 1, ..., 8 . . . [4.0; +∞)
2001Q1-2008Q2 (−∞;−0.1] . . . [0.5(k − 1); 0.5k − 0.1], k = 1, ..., 7 . . . [3.5; +∞)
2008Q3-2009Q1 (−∞;−0.1] . . . [0.5(k − 1); 0.5k − 0.1], k = 1, ..., 8 . . . [4.0; +∞)
2009Q2-2009Q4 (−∞;−2.1] . . . [0.5(k − 1); 0.5k − 0.1], k = −3, ..., 8 . . . [4.0; +∞)
2010Q1-present (−∞;−1.1] . . . [0.5(k − 1); 0.5k − 0.1], k = −1, ..., 8 . . . [4.0; +∞)
Notes: The table illustrates changes to the range of SPF density forecasts, fi,t+h|t, in the questionnaire of
the ECB. Density forecasts are issued by forecasters i = 1, ..., 98 in sample period t = 1, ..., 58, representing
time instances between 1999Q1 and 2013Q2, with forecast horizon h ∈ {4, 8, 20}. Each row depicts the
upper and lower intervals whereas k indicates the intermediate intervals.
Table 2: Correlations across aggregate IU measures
σ2t+4|t σ
2
t+8|t σ
2
t+20|t s
2
t+4|t s
2
t+8|t s
2
t+20|t σ
2
λ,t+4|t σ
2
λ,t+8|t σ
2
λ,t+20|t
σ2t+4|t 1.00
σ2t+8|t 0.98 1.00
σ2t+20|t 0.92 0.94 1.00
s2t+4|t 0.50 0.50 0.28 1.00
s2t+8|t 0.47 0.47 0.32 0.73 1.00
s2t+20|t 0.44 0.47 0.38 0.43 0.63 1.00
σ2λ,t+4|t 0.70 0.68 0.80 -0.26 -0.08 0.14 1.00
σ2λ,t+8|t 0.84 0.85 0.88 0.14 -0.06 0.16 0.82 1.00
σ2λ,t+20|t 0.84 0.84 0.94 0.14 0.11 0.05 0.82 0.89 1.00
Notes: The sample period t = 1, ..., 58 represents time instances between 1999Q1 and 2013Q2. The
IU measures σ2t+h|t, s
2
t+h|t and σ
2
λ,t+h|t refer to average individual IU, disagreement and the variance of
aggregate shocks from equations (5), (7) and (6) at forecast horizons h ∈ {4, 8, 20}, respectively. Cor-
relations which highlight the relationship between distinct measures of IU for different forecast horizons
are marked in boldface.
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Table 3: Estimates of the horizon effects on the variance of aggregate shocks
Variance of aggregate shocks σ2λ,t+h|t
h = 4, 8, 20
Dh=4 Indicator variable for h = 4 1.57
(0.81)
Dh=8 Indicator variable for h = 8 9.33*
(0.85)
Dh=20 Indicator variable for h = 20 15.06*
(1.13)
t− 1 Time trend 0.37*
(0.02)
DRECt−1 Recession indicator variable 1.26
(0.74)
Adj. R2 0.96
No. of observations 164
Notes: This table reports the estimates of equation (8). The sample period t = 1, ..., 58 represents time
instances between 1999Q1 and 2013Q2. Coefficients are estimated with OLS. Heteroskedasticity-robust
standard errors in parentheses. The reported coefficients and standard errors are the estimated ones
times 100. Asterisks (“*”) indicate significance at the 5% critical level.
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Table 5: Estimates of the determinants of the variance of aggregate shocks
Variance of aggregate shocks σ2λ,t+h|t
h = 4 h = 8 h = 20
(1) (2) (3)
pit−1 Inflation rate 1.99 3.75* 3.27*
(1.26) (1.13) (0.93)
∆xt−1 Real GDP growth rate -0.65 -1.34* -1.45*
(0.40) (0.59) (0.47)
RVt−1(E) Stock price volatility -49.66 -24.41 -34.91
(29.72) (19.98) (22.78)
∆EPUt−1 Economic Policy Uncertainty 5.62 4.47 4.53
(4.13) (3.75) (4.01)
∆ASt−1 ECB assets -25.48* -9.66 -6.42
(10.48) (8.55) (12.03)
TD+t−1 Positive Taylor deviations -3.81 -4.12 -6.98*
(2.45) (2.42) (2.64)
|TD−t−1| Negative Taylor deviations 4.87* 5.71* 4.13*
(1.59) (0.97) (1.07)
MPCt−1 Monetary Policy Communicator -4.81 0.07 -7.07*
(3.60) (2.40) (2.79)
∆MMt−1 Money multiplier -4.86* -3.62* -1.67
(1.59) (1.26) (2.41)
Constant 12.23* 12.87* 20.64*
(3.55) (2.80) (3.75)
t− 1 Time trend 0.06 0.07 0.14*
(0.09) (0.06) (0.07)
DRECt−1 Recession indicator variable -0.90 0.17 -0.95
(1.62) (1.41) (1.64)
R2 0.66 0.81 0.73
No. of observations 56 56 50
Notes: This table reports the estimates of equation (20). The sample period t = 1, ..., 58 represents
time instances between 1999Q1 and 2013Q2. Coefficients are estimated with OLS. Newey-West standard
errors accounting for fourth-order autocorrelation in parentheses. The reported coefficients and standard
errors are the estimated ones times 100. Asterisks (“*”) indicate significance at the 5% critical level.
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Figure 1: SPF forecaster panel
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Notes: Graphs depict forecaster participation in SPF surveys between 1999Q1 and 2013Q2 for forecast
horizons h ∈ {4, 8, 20}. Each cross indicates that a density forecast is reported by a survey participant.
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Figure 2: Inflation expectations and uncertainty measures
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Notes: Graphs depict inflation expectations and inflation uncertainty measures for forecast horizons
h ∈ {4, 8, 20} from left to right. The horizontal axis denotes the periods during which surveys are deliv-
ered. The solid black lines in the plots in the first row are the cross-sectional means of the individual
expectations.
Figure 3: Macroeconomic and policy variables
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Notes: Graphs depict variables measuring macroeconomic conditions and indicators of monetary policy.
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